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NOTE AND COMMENT
SPJO:C!Ar, Ass~SMENTs UPON CtM:im:RIES.-Though the power to tax cemeteries would seem to be 'entirely clear, very c;:ommonly land devoted to such
purpose is declared by constitution or statute to be e..xempt. See COOLEY,
TAXATION, (3rd ed.) 354- So also in the case of special assessments such
land, in the absence of a clear exemption, is liable thereto. Bluomi11gton
Cemetery Assoc. v. People, 139 Ill. 16, 28 N. E. 1076; Mulli11s v. Cemetery
Assoc., 239 Mo. 681, 144 S. W. 109; Buffalo City Cem~tary v. Buffalo, 46
N. Y. 503; Lima v. Lima Cemetery Assoc., 42 Oh. St. 128, 51 Am. Rep. Sog.
It may be suggested, in view of the theory upon which special assessments go; that the owner of the land gets back the· amount assessed in benefits from an enhanced value of the property, land dedicated to cemetery purposes perpetually would not be subject to such assessments. This contention
was urged in Garden Cemeter~,' Corporation V: Baker, 218 Mass. 339, 105
N. E. 1070 (1914), and under the facts there pres~nted was rejected, the
court distinguishing Mount Aub11rn Cemeters. v. Cambridge, 150 Mass. 12.
Where all the lots are sold and used for burial and under the law the company cannot divert the land to other uses, perhaps the argument might be
difficult to meet. Exemption from special assessment, then, in general, it
would seem, must be found, if at all, in some provision or' provisions of the
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constitution, statutes, or charter, or in some inherent difficulty in the collection of tlie assessments.
Exemption from "assessments," it is held, will exempt from special assessments. State v. St. Paul, 36 Minn. 529, 32 N. \V. 781; In re New York, 192
N. Y. 459, 85 N. E. 755; Swan Point Cemetery v. Tripp, 14 R. I. 199. But
an exemption from "taxation" does not have the same result. Bloomington
Cemetery Assoc.· v. People, s11pra; Lima v. Lima Cemetery Assoc. supra;
Mullins v. i,dount St. Mary's Cemetery Assoc., supra. And in Baltimore v.
Green Mount Cemetery, 7 Md. 5l7, it was held that a statute providing that
land forever appropriated and set apart as a cemetery so long as used as
such "shall not be liable to any tax or public imposition whatsoever," did not
exempt from special assessments. As to the effect of an exemption from
"execution" the courts·are not agreed. ·That such exemption includes special
assessments was held in In re Sizth Ave. West, Seattle, 59 Wash. 41, 109
Pac. 1052, where the statute provided that any part .of a burial ground appropriated as burying place for any particular person or family "s~ll not be
liable to be taken or disposed of by any warrant or e.'Cecution, for any tax
or d.ebt whatever," the court, however, holding the tmsold portions of the
cemetery liable to the assessment; and in Union Dale Cemetery Company's
Case, 227 Pa. St. 1, 75 Atl. 835, where the charter of the company exempted
the land of the company and the burial lots therein "from execution, at. tachment, taxation, or any other 1ien or process." In the latter case the
court said that a confirmation of the assessment would mean the fastening
of a lien on the land, which if not paid would lead to a sale, for "the right
of lien includes the power to sell, else the lien would be a nullity." On the
other hand it has been held that such exemption from execution does not
include special assessments. Bloomington Cemetery Assoc. v. People, supra,
holding such exemption only relieves from sale on fl. fa.; Mullinsv.MountSt.
Mary's Cemetery Assoc., supra; Lima v. Cemetery Assoc. supra, holding
·that there could. be no sale to pay the a!!sessment, but that the city' could
collect "by appointment of a receiver, by se·questration, or such other appro·
priate remedy as equity may afford, without in any way disturbing the rest·
ing place of those reposing in 'the city o"f the dead'." There was a statute
in· Ohio which gave remedy for recovery of the assessment by action. See
infra.
.
The main question came before the Supreme Court of Michigan in Woodmere Cem~tcry Ass'n. v. Detroit, (Sept. 26, 1916), 159 N. W. 383. The cem·
etery Association having failed to pay a special assessment for paving a
street upon which the cemetery abutted, the city sold the land and bid it in,
there being no oth~r bidders. The association .by bill in equity asked to have
the sale set aside and to remove the cloud created by the apparent liens
held by the city. The lower i::ourt granted the relief prayed for, holding
that the city had not proceeded according to law in levying the assessment
and that the cemetery property was exempt from any such sale. By an
evenly divided court the Supreme Court affirmed the decree. The four
judges for affirmance went on the gro':lnd that land used for cemetery _pur:-
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poses was "exempt from the particular tax by virtue of a settled state policy
evidenced by the provisions in the charter of complainant and in other: state
statutes." The other judges while agreeing that the land could not be sold
for the purpose of collecting the assessment, were of opinion that the "land
was subject to the assessment which should be collected by way of a decree
that such special assessment was a debt due from the association to the city.
How:i;:r.r.'s MxcH. STATUTl!s, § 13025, provide that "all cemeteries, tombs,
and rights of burial, while in use as repositories of the dead" shall be "exempt
from levy and sale under any execution, or upon any final process of a
court''. It was upon this statute, upon the case of Avery v. Forest Lawn
Cemetery Co.; 127 Mich. 125, 86 N. W. 538, applying the statute in an action
seeking a sale of cemetery land to pay a debt, and upon the limitations on '
the association's power to sell and use the land for nothing but cemetery
purposes, that the prevailing judges relied in holding the land ·exempt from
the assessment.
That the cemetery should be exempt from sale would seem, for obvious
reasons, a very proper conclusion: No doubt a court would be astute to
iind ground on which to base such a determination. But does it necessarily
follow that because the land is· held exempt from s·ale that therefore there
is no liability for such assessments? In Drr.r.oN, MuNICIPAr, CORPORATIONS,
(§ 822) on the basis of Mcfoerny v. Reed, 23 Iowa 4Io, it is said that "where
:the charter of a city conferred upon it the power 'to levy and collect' a
special tax for local improvements and declared such tax to bl! 'a lien' upon
the real estate upon which it should be assessed, and no mode of collection
was prescr~bcd; and no power to collect by sale existed, the court was of
opinibn that the lien might be enforced in equity, and the power 'to collect'
be exercised by the corporation by a suit in its name." This
approved
and adopted by the Ohio court in Lima v. Cemetery Assoc., supra. But in
Cave Hill Cemetery Co. v. Gosnell, 156 Ky. 599, 161 S. Vil. 98o (1913), in an
action on a warrant against the Cemetery Company for its part of' the cost
of paving a street, the lower court held the cemetery subject to the lien,
though not subject 'to a sale therefor, on the authority of Lo11iwille.v. Nevin,
IO Bush. 549, and ordered the company, it appearing that it had funds, to pay ·
the amount of the assessment into court within twenty days. J'he Supreme
Court reversed the decision, saying that "To require the cemetery company
to pay the apportionment warrant when its land is not suhject to a lien .would
be in effect to make the owner of the property personally liable for the
amount sued for. But we have often held that the .owner is not personally
liable for the cost of a street improvement * * * •.ro require the cemetery
company to pay the money into court is only in another form to subject its
property to a lien. All the funds in the hands of the cemetery company are
held in trust to maintain the cemetery and to .require these funds to be paid
out for other purposes is to require the trustee to divert the funds from the
trust to which they were dedicated:"
However it may -be in cases of the characte:i: just referred to, there would
seem to be no reasonable basis for denying the power of the legislature, in
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the absence of constitutional restrictions, to provide for the recovery of the
: amount of such· assessments by appropriate actions designed to that end.
The exemption, to whatever extent it is granted, is whqlly a matter of favor,
which can be extended upon such terms as the legislature may see fit. The
Ohio statute (§ 38g8, P. & A. ANN. Gr:N. Conr:) which provides that any
unpaid special assessment may be recovered by suit against the landowner
was upheld as constitutional in Hill v. Higdon, 5 Oh. St. 243; Gest v. Cincinnati, 26 Oh. St. 275. Of course if ;ll of the funds of the cemetery company were held in trust for special purposes, the remedy may be of no avail.
The Detroit city cliarter (§ 22I) provides that "the said receiver shall have
power in the name of the city oi Detroit to prosecute any person refusing
or neglecting to pay such taxes or any special assessment by a suit in the
circuit court for the County of Wayne, and he shall have, use, and take all
lawful ways and means provided by law for the collection of debts, to enforce the payment of any such tax or any special assessment." Assuming
the validity of such charter provision, may it not well be that by a proceeding
thereunder and the assistance of the powers of a' court of equity along the
line of the doctrine of Mcinerny v. Reed, supra, and Lima v. Cemetery Assoc.,
supra, it would be possib'e to reach non-trust funds of the Association?
R.
A.

w.

. T:ar: R.IGH'r 'to EMPI.OY lNCONSlS'rr:N'l' Dr:F!!NSl!S.~The case of McAlpine
v. Fiaelity at1d Casualty Company of New Ynrk, 158 N. W. 967, decided July
28, I9I6, by the Supreme Court of Minnesota, sets forth clearly what-l!hould
be the modem doctrine.respecting inconsistent defenses. In
action on an
accident policy for death resulting through accidental means, the defendant·
alleged that the death was caused by suicide and f~rther that \it was caused
by the bellefic;:iary. The· court denied the plaintiff's motion that the defendant
be required to elect upon which claini it would rely, the motion being "based
upon the ground that the two defenses were inconsistent. The Supreme
Court held that the ruling of the lower court was correct.
·
The Minnesota statute reads as follows : "The defendant may set forth
by answer as many defenses and counterclaims as he has. They shall be separately stated, and so framed as to show the cause of action to which each
is intended to be opposed." (R. L. IQ05, § 4132, G. S. I9l3, § 7758). This
. provision is very similar to that found in many other state codes, and nowhere does it make the requirement of consistency among defenses. Whatever rule has come to be effective, is the result of construction, and under
•earlier Minnesota decisions the rule was established that separate defenses·
must be consistent. Booth v. Sherwo1Jd, I2 Minn. ¢ ; Steenerson v. Waterbury, 52 Minn. 2n, 53 N. W. n46; Rees v. Storms, IOI Minn. 38I, u2 N. W.
4i9.
The common law rule was that a defendant could ·plead only one defense
without infringing the rule against duplicity. By the statute of 4 Anne, a
party was allowed "to plead as many several matters thereto as he shall
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think necessary for his defense." However, they could not be inconsistent
with one another. Even what is known· as inconsistency by implication of
law was at first not allowed. This rule was later relaxed so as to allow all
those not inconsistent in fact. The rule in equity is very similar to the
related rule under the Statute of Anne, and provides that two defenses are ·
inconsistent and cannot be pleaded together when, if the evidence ~upport
ing one is true, the evidence supporting the other cannot be true in point
of fact. ~ L. R. A. 183, Notes 111, IV, and V.
Textwriters have disagreed upon the weight of authority, both as to allowing inconsistent pleas, and as to 'what constitutes such inconsistency as will·
prevent defenses being joined under Code procedure. Poi.n:zwy in his work
on Cont REMEDIES {4th ed.) § 598, citing cases to support him, states this to
be the rule: "Assuming that defenses are utterly inconsistent, the rule is
established by an overwhelming weight of judicial authority that, unless expressly prohibited by statute, they may still be united in one answer. It
follows that .the defendant, cannot be compelled to elect between such de-·
fenses, nor can evidence in favor· of either be e.xcluded at the trial on the
ground of the inconsistency." To the co'ntrary is the following, "under the
new procedure there is spme contrariety in the decisions but the rule estab- .
lished by the weight of authority both in reason and in numbers, is in harmony with the rule in equity, that two defenses so inconsistent in point of
fact that both cannot be true, so that the establishment· of one is the destruc-.
tion of the other, cannot be joined." PHILI.lPS, Cons Pr.~NG, § 261. In
the latter work, commenting upon the above statement of Mr. PoMSOY, the
author says : "He has overlooked the distinction between contradictory facts
and lpgical inconsistency; and has reached a conclusion that is not warranted,
and that is not sustained by the cases he cites to support it. It would be a
reprbach to our system of procedure if defendants were allowed to set up
defenses ad libitum, without r~gard to whether they were true or false, consistent or inconsistent; and such license is not to be drawn from the spirit
of the codes, and is not sanctioned by the weight of authority." Citing,
Br.1ss, Pr.EADING, 344; BooN:E, Pr.EADING, 78; SWANN, Pr.FADING, 267.
A great number of cases have -apparently allowed inconsistent drienses,
48 L. R. A. 185, Note VI, a. But the courts deciding them have made quite
indefinite and unsatisfactory statements as to what constitute inconsistent
defenses, and an examination of the decisions shows that in many of. them,
and probably in a majority of them, the defenses were really not inconsistent
in fact, but only in law. Logical inconsistencies and inconsistencies by implication of l;iw have always been allowed.
There are thus developed two distinct· questions,-(1) are the defenses
pleaded inconsistent? and (2) if so, can they be pleaded together? And it is
very noticeable that while many courts profess to disallow inconsistent de~
'fenses, they are almost invariably successful in finding that the defenses befo:e them are susceptible of such a construction as to make them consistent.
In many instances they have gone to almost absurd lengths to sustain the
rule in 'theory while denying it any effective force in practice. Loveland v.
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Jenkin-Boys Co., 49 Wash. 369; Ba11k of Glencoe v. Caill, 89 Minn. 473, 95
N. W. 3o8; Bank v. Closson, 29 Oh. St. 78.
The very fact that so many courts have held defenses to be consistent,
when in fact they probably w:ere not, is a very persuasive argument in favor
of the conclusion reached by the principal case. The Supreme Court of
Minnesota there held that the general rule (as to inconsistent defenses)
should and would not be applied "so as to prevent a meritorious defense or
woi;k manifest injustice." The end sought was a speedy trial on the merits,
not an artistic and symmetrical system of pleading. Their attitude is well
expressed thus: "Naturally enough the legal mind revolts at a rule of pleading which requires a defendant to choose which of two defenses he will interpose, though both cannot be true, and neither is within his knowledge, at the
peril of losing all if he mistakes, for when called upon to elect he is having
his final. day in court." It is inconsistent with the spirit of the modern procedure to refuse to allow a defendant to plead inconsistent defenses, when
piere is a real doubt in the pleader's mind as to what the evidence will disclose. At least, he should be allowed to state them in the alternative, stating also the ·reason for so doing. There is the same reason for allowing
alternative statements of defenses as for allowing alternative statements of
the right of action. Michigan, by its new Court Rules following the JumCAiuu Ar!r oF 1915, has fully abandoned the rule of consistency and ·allows
incons.istent counts and defenses to be freely pleaded and presented to the.
jury. (Rule 21, § 7.) New Jersey; in its recent PRAC!rrcr: Ac::r, has done the
same thing. (Laws, 1912, Chap. 231, § 24.) It is to be hoped that the recent
Minnesota rule will have many followers, who .will frankly allow inconsistent
defenses instead of going to douhtful extremes in trying to adhere to the
•old rule by ca11ing inconsistent defenses con~istent.
H. G. G.
QRAJ, CoN~r!r.TO MAKS A ~vis:e OR CoNV:eYANct OF LAND.7 Damages can
never be recovered ·at law for breach of a contract which does not comply
with "the Statute of Frauds. On the other hand, if suit is brought in equity
for specific performance, such relief will be granted under some circumstances. · In a recent case, the plaintiff, the niece of the deceased, was treated
by him as a membe·r of the family. During girlhood and even after marriage, she performed many services of a personal nature for the deceased
and wife. In compensation for these services, the deceased orally promised
to will all of.· his property to the plaintiff. The deceased however made no
will. Upon hiS death, the plaintiff brought an action against the administrator
for specific performance of the oral contract. Held, ·that this relief should
be granted. Rine v. Rine (Neb. 1916), 158 N. W. 941. In another recent
case, the facts of which were precisely similar, the New Jersey court refused
to decree specific performance. Bo11la11ger v. Churchill (N. J. 1916), 97 Atl.
947. These two contrary decisions offer an opportunity for an inquiry into
the theory or theories upon which equity, under some circumstances, gives
effect to an oral contract to convey or devise lands in spite of the Statute
of Frauds.
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Most courts hold that the Statute of Frauds applies to oral contracts to
devise lands as well as to oral contracts to convey lands. Ji1dy v. Gilbert,
77 Ind. g6, 40 Am. Rep. 289; Berge v. Hiatt's Adm., 82 Ky. 666; co11tra, semble, Soper v. Galloway, 129 Ia. 145, 105 N. W. 399. An early case, decided
nine years after the enactment of the Statute of Frauds, held that, in an
action for specific performance, the taking of possession by the vendee was
a sufficient act of part performance to take the agreement out of the operation of the statute. 1'utcher v. Stapely, I Vernon 363 (1685). But there has
.since grown up a grave conflict as to what particular acts of part performance are necessary. Jt is well settled in England and in the great majority
of American jurisdictions that the payment of purchase money, in full or
.in part, is not sufficient. Britain v. Rossiter, II Q. B. Div. 123, 131; Cooper
v. Colson, 66 N. ]. Eq. 328, 58 Atl. 337; Bake v. Wiw.:ell, 17 Neb. 52. The
contrary view has been taken in Delaware, probably in Georgia and by statute in Io:wa. Ho11ston v. Toumshend, l Del. Cli. 416, 12 Am. Dec. 109;
Rawlins v. Shropshire, 45 Ga. 182; lowA Cons, § 4626. The majority view
is no doubt the better, for the payment of money is an equivocal act, i. e.,
it does not necessarily refer to a contract for the sale of the particular land;
and the rule also works no great injury as the vendee can recover the pur<:hase price in an action at law. H11ll v. Thomas, 82 Conn. 647; Mills v.
Joiner, 20 Fla. 479.
The English view and that of some of the American courts is that possession taken by vendee in pursuance of an oral contract will take the case otit
<>f the statute. · Clinan v. Cook, I Sch. & Lef. 22, 40; Wharton v. Stouten"burgh, 35 N. ]. Eq. 266; Pugh v. Good, 3 W. & s: (Pa.) 56, 37 Am. Dec. 534- ·
There are m,any dicta following the English view but fo most of the cases
there were other acts of part performance in addition to taking possession
by the vendee. The courts of Massachusetts, 'l'e.""Cas, and Kansas insist that
possession by the vendee must be accomplished by such circumsta11ces as
would' lead to irreparable injury in case the relief is denied. Burns v. Daggett, 141 Mass. 368; Weatherford Co. v. Wood, 88 Tex. 191; Baldridge v.
Centgraf, 82 Kans. 240. In the following cases, substantial payments or
improvements were required in addition to possession by the vendee. Dunckel v. Dunckel, 141 N. Y. 427; Derr v. Ackerman, 182 Pa. 591; Holmes v.
Caden, 57 Vt. III. The following cases illustrate the rule in their respective
states that possession must be accompanied by at least substantial payment
(nothi~g said concerning improvements). Wright v. Ra/tree, 181 Ill. 464;
Nelson v. Shelby Co., g6 Ala. 515 (statutory); Wallace v. Scoggins, 17 Ore.
476. In Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina and Virginia (by statute,
Cong § 2413), nothing except fraud will take the case out of the Statute of
Frauds and the doctrine of part performance is thoroughly repudiated. The
.application of this rule may no doubt seem to work great hardship but it
is the only rule in which the courts do not rewrite the Statute of Frauds.
In the principal cases however, possession by the plaintiff cannot take the
<:ase out of the statute for it is part of the agreement that the devisor is to
remain in poss.ession and any possession taken by the plaintiff would not be
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exclusive. The cases in which possession by the plaintiff is impossible must
,be considered separately and, as the principal cases suggest, there is a conflict of authority in the decisions. Even where the consideration on the part
of the plaintiff consists of past services of a very personal nature and he
has given up his home or business in order to render them, there is a grave
conflict. The following cases are in accord with the principal Nebraska case:
Lloyd v. Hollenbeck, 98 Mich. 203; Best v. Gralapp, 6g Neb. 8n (not cited
in principal case); Pfl11gar v. 'Fultz, 43 N. J. Eq. 440 (see valuable note).
On the other hand, the following cases .take a contrary view : Grant
v. Grant, 63 Conn._530; Wallace v. Long, 105 Ind. 522; Balditin v. Squier, 31
Kans. 283; Orabill v. Marsh, 38 Oh. St. 331. It is interesting to notice that
without a review of the authorities, the court in the princip'al New Jersey
case decides contrary ta a line of at least five decisions in its own state.
Under the circumstances of an admitted conflict, it is well to inquire into
the theory ·upon which equity will decree specific performance of oral contracts required to be in writing by the Statute of Frauds. By granting relief equity is clearly rewriting the Statute of Frauds, and there must be
some theory upon which it proceeds to do so. Furthermore, it would seem
that if equity does this on one ground in cases in which possession is possible it ought logically tc;> be on the same ground in cases in which it is not
possible for the plaintiff to take possession. There are at least two distinct
theories suggested by the cases. Tlie first is that equity will seek a substitute for the writing requirJd by the statute, i. e., such acts of part performance as are referable to a contract concerning this particular land. This is
no doubt the theory underlying the English, the New York and the Illinois
groups of cases, supra. Th~ second theory is the one suggested by the principal Nebraska case, that equity will decree specific performance where otherwise the injury to the plaintiff would be, in fact, irreparable. The Massachusetts doctrine is perhaps a combination of both theories ·but no court
adopts the theory of irreparable injury alone, where possession is possible.
It would seem th'en that in cases in which possession is impossibie, the
courts should refuse to grant specific performance unless there are other
. acts which are referable only to a contract for the land in question. It cannot be said that the services performed in the principal cases are referable
only to a contract for a devise of the particular lands. Hence, if the New
Jersey court in the principal case proceeded on the theory of part performance referable to the contract, it was right in denying relief. But in the
principal Nebraska case, the court shifted over to the theory of irreparable
injury in cases in which possession is impossible. This seems illogical, but
justice is no doubt obtained in this manner. There are at least two variations or combinations of these theories. In the leading English case of Maddison v. AI<lerson, L. R. 8 App. Cases 467, Lord SF.I.BORNS insists that there
must be such acts of part perf~rmance as are clearly referable only to ·a
contract concerning this particular land. If this is shown, then he will consider whether. more· substantial justice would be accomplished by granting
specific performance than by refusing it. This is in realitr a combination
0
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of both views. On the other hand, Lord BLACKDl.."RN recognized that it is
settled law that a change of possession will take a case out of the Statute
of Frauds, but he regards this as an anomaly and refuses to extend it to
cases in which there is no change of possession. This is a limitation of the
first theory.
When the plaintiff has rendered ordinary personal or professional services,
the value of which can be readily estimated, his injury is not irreparable, and
specific performance should be denied under any of these theories. Where
the services are very personal, however, such as the care of an aged person, especially .when it necessitates an abandonment by the plaintiff of his
business or his home, it is no doubt just to grant specific performance. As
PoMl!ROY says : "There are things which money cannot buy; a thousand
nameless and delicate services and attentions incapable of being the subject
of explicit contract, which money with all its peculiar potency, is powerless
to purchase."
T. E. A.
0

WHAT CoNsn-run:s !NTERSTA'n: CoMM:£RC£ UNDER Tirt F:ED:eRAL E'MPLOY-

us

LIABILITY ACT or lgo8?-The material provisions of the act are "That
every common carrier by railroad while engaged in commerce between any
of the several states or territories * * * shall be liable in damages to any
person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier. in. such commerce * * * for such injury or death, resulting in whole or in part from the
negligence of any of the officials, agents, or employees of such carrier, or
by reason of any defect or insufficiency, due to its negl'igence, in its cars,
engines * * *" CoMPILW STATU'.l'tS 1913, §§ 8657-8665. As stated in the
case of Pederson v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 197 Fed. 537, II7 C. C. A. 33,
"the object of this act was to broaden the tight to relief for damages suffered
by railroad employees in interstate transportation." This act, unlike the one
condemned in Employer's Liability Cases, 207 U. S. 463, 28 S\lP· Ct. 141, 52
L. Ed. 297, deals only with the liability of a carrier engaged in interstate
commerce (Mcmdou v. Ne--..v York, N. H. & Harlfor<l c;o., Z!3 U. S. l, 38
L. R. A. N. S. 44, 32 Sup. Ct.. l6g, 56 L. ed. 327), the old one being condemned because o~ its being an attempt to regulate liability for injuries not
only from interstate traffic, but also from intrastate traffic. And to recover,
plaintiff must not only be employed by such interstate carrier, but must himself have a real and substantial connection with th~ interstate commerce in
which the carriers and their employees are engaged; it is on this questionthe relation of the plaintiff himself to such interstate commerce-that most
of the cases turn in the interpretation of the statue. Pedersen v. Delaware
&c. Co., supra. The court must find that he himself was at the time of the
injury engaged in interstate commerce. Lucchetti v. Philadelphia & R. Ry.
Co., 233 Fed. 137·
·
An engineer hauling cars engaged in both interstate and intrastate commerce was held by the North Carolina Supreme Court to have been engaged
in interstate commerce in Horton v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 157 N. C. 14(),
72 S. E. 958. And it is settled that if one is engaged at the time in inter-

MICHIG.4.N LAW REVIEW

158

state commerce, the fact that at the same time he is engaged in intrastate
commerce will not put hini beyond the protection of the statute. Accordingly
it is held that a brakeman on a train containing cars loaded iwith interstate
freight is engaged. in "interstate commerce" within the act, even though the
train runs only between intrastate poin,ts. Waters v. Guile, 234 Fed. 532;
Behrens v. Ill. Cent. R. Co., 192 Fed. 581. The North Carolina courts hold
contra to this, however, in the case of Zachary v. North Carolina R. Co., 156
N.· C. 4g6, 72 S. E. 858, holding that a fireman killed while attending his engiiie, which was about to haul some freight which was interstate commerce,
was not so engaged in interstate commerce, as his run was to have been
wholly intrastate. In Van Brimmer v. Texas & P. Ry., rgo Fed. 394. it was
held that a brakeman injured while making a flying sw~tch to set out a car
transported wholly in interstate traffic was not within the statute, even though
such car were a part of a train carrying both interstate and intrastate commerce. This can be reconciled with the later case of ivaters v. Guile, supra,
only upon the theory that at the time of the inury the plaintiff was engaged,
not as a brakeman on the train, but simply as to the one car which was at
the time being "spotted." Otherwise it is in accord with the North Carolina
case above. In case tJie brakeman is injured while "spotting'' a car which
itself is being shipped to another state, even though it be at the time a part
of an intrastate train, there can be no doubt but that he is within the protection of the statute. Rich v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., 166 Mo. App. 397,
148 S. W. lOII; Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Ban~s, 156 Ky. 6og, 161 S. W.
554- In Montgomer:y v. Southern Pacific Co., ~Ore. 597, 131 Pac. 507, the
Oregon supreme court held that members of a switching crew engaged in
switching cars loaded, or to be loaded, with interstate commodities, and injured while hauling them to another place within the state, from which an
interstate train could more conveniently take them, were engaged in interstate commerce.
Where a shipment from one point to another, both within the state, in
the course of transportation passed through another state, it was held to be
an interstate shipment within the statute. Lo11isvilic t"-r N. R. Co. v Allen,
l~ Ky. 145. 153 s.
lg8.
Where an employee engaged in interstate commerce has been ordered to
report, or by custom or necessity does so, and is injured while on his way to
his post, the general rule is that he is at the time engaged in interstate commerce, and is protected by the statute. Lamphere v. Oregon R. & Nav. Co.,
lg6 Fed. 336; illinois Central R. Co. v. Nelson, 203 Fed. 956; Missouri, K. &
T. Ry. Co. of Te~as v. Rentz (Tex. Civ. App. 1912), 162 S. W. 959.
An electric Int~rurban Railway is held to be a "railroad" within the statute.
Mc Adow v. Kansas City Western RJ•. Co. (Mo. App. 1914), 164 S. W. 188.
"Where a railroad is engaged in transporting logs from a woods to a distant mill, within the state, the fact that such logs are there made into lumber
which then becomes a part·of interstate commerce does not bring such rail. road within the statute as being engaged in interstate commerce. Bay v.
Merrill & Ring Lumber Co., 2II Fed. 717.
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As regards employees working on instrumentalities which have not yet
been used and made an actual part of a carrier's interstate system, the general rule seems to be that such employees are not engaged in interstate c~m
merce within the statute. Such was the case in Raymond v. Chicago, M. &
St. P. Ry. Co., 233 Fed. 239, where a laborer working in a tunnel which,
when completed, would be used by a railroad company engaged in both inter..
state and intrastate commerce, as part of its line, was held not within the
statute, the reason being that there was no assurance that such tunnel. would
ever be completed, or even if it were, that it would ever be used and made
a part of such interstate system. In Thomps_on v. Colunibia & P. S. R. Co.,
205 Fed. :zo3, it was held that a worl.-man killed while repairing a bridge on
the line over which interstate commerce was carried. by defendant was within the act, on the ground that such bridge had already been made a part of
such interstate system. Pedersen v. Delaware, etc. Co .. suPra, was a case of
an employee injured while laying an additional track over a bridge which had
always supported other tracks used in interstate commerce by the defendant.
and the court held that the plaintiff was not engaged in repairing the bridge,
which was then a part of the interstate system, but was engaged in laying
a new track, which had not yet become a part of such interstate system, and
therefore not within the protection of the statute. The fact that he was injured by an interstate train was immaterial
Regarding the nature of employees engaged in repairing instrumentalities
of interstate carriers, which have already _been used and made a part of such
system, but which are for the time being out of such use, there is much conflict of opinion. In Pierson v. New York, S. & W.R. Co., 83 N. J. L. 661,
85 Atl. 233, the New Jersey court said: "The final test is the refation of the
employee's work to interstate transportation at the time of the injury. The
repairi~g of an instrument of commerce, which is used sometimes in interstate transportation, whether it be the road-bed of a railroad, or a car or
an engine which is run over it, is not an engaging in commerce, but a preparation for engaging therein in the future." The Wisconsin court, in Ruck
v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 153 Wis. 158, says: "It is the use to which
the appliance or instrumentality is put at the time, rather than the nature of
the instrumentality itself, which determines whether or not it is employed in
interstate commerce; and where such instrumentality at the time repairs are
being made upon it, is not being used to facilitate interstate commerce, but is
being repaired to make it ready for either inter- or intra-state use, as occasion may require in the future, an· employee engaged in such repairs is not
employed in interstate commerce within the meaning of the statute. He
must be employed directly in transportation, or in some act directly facilitating such transportation." The decision in that case was that a railroad employee repairing cars at its repair shop when the cars are not en route is not
within the statute.
On the other hand, it was held in M 011tgomery v. Southern Pacific Co.,
supra, that "all employees who participate in the maintenance or operation
of the instrumentalities for the general use of an interstate railroad are en-
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gaged in int~rstate commerce within the act. And
"THI': LIABILITY oF RAILROADS 'to !NnRS't.o\.Ti;: EMPr.on:.:s:• speaking of what
employees are included as "engaged in interstate commerce," says: " * * *
mechanics, or car repairmen, while engaged in work upon interstate cars or
other interstate instrumentalities, "and ,vbile passing over the road for the
purpose of making repairs upon cars or engines of an interstate train, are
also incl.uded." And the great weight of decisions supports this latter view,
that the control ~f Congress extends not only to the interstate commerce
itself, but also to the control of the instrumentalities through which such
commerce is carried ori. That the following are included: a pumper of water
for interstate trains, Horton v. Oregon, Washington R. & Nav. Co., 72 \\Tash.
503, 130 Pac. 897, in -y;hicb case the court said: "it is not the source of the
injury which determines, but rather the effect of the injury upon inti?t'state
commerce;" one repairing the track of an interstate carrier, Zikos v. Oregon
R. & N. Co., 179 Fed. 893; one engaged in repairing a switch used both in
·inter- and intra-state traffic, Colasurdo v. Cent. R, R. of N. l., i8o Fed. 832;
one repairing a boiler regularly used in interstate traffic. in shops of railroad,
Law v. Cent. R.R. Co., 208 Fed. 86!), 126 C. C. A. 27; a servant putting in
new block system of signals over interstate line, Grow v. Oregon Short Line
R. Co., 44 Utah l6o, 138 Pac. 398: one repairing a telegraph line of an interstate road, b¥ which trains were directed, Deal v. Coal & Coke R. Co., 215
Fed. 285; one sweeping snow from a switch of an interstate line, Hardwick
v. Wabash R. Co., 181 Mo. 156, 168 S. W. 328; an engineer making a test run
of an engine to be used exclusively for interstate commerce, such test run
. being wholly within the state, Llo~.'d v. Southern Rs: Co., 166 N. C. 24t 81
S. E. 1003. Probably the most extreme decision under this doctrine is that
of Cousins v. Ill. Cent. R. Co., 126 Minn. 172, 148 N. W. 58, in which it was
held that an. employee of an interstate carrier injured wlllle wheeling coal for
the shop in whiCh the other employees were repairing cars used in intetstate
commerce, .was so engaged in interstate commerce as to come within the act.
Summing' up the better and more generally recognized rule, the court in
Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Maerkl, 198 Fed. I, II7 C. C. A. 237, says; "it is
equally plain that those engaged in the repair, of such car are as much engaged in interstate commei:ce as * * *·any of· the operati.ves who [after it
is returned again to such active service] handle it in such traffic." The Texas
court in Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. of Texas v. Denahy, (Tex. Civ. App.
1914), 165 S. W. 529 holds: "that such emp,loyee is so engaged [in interstate
commerce] when such car is intended to be used in interstate commerce on
being repaired." And the spirit of that decision seems to be that if such
car had previously, and up to the time of internment for repairs, been used
in interstate commerce, then the presumption is that it is intended to be kept
in such service, unless it be affirmatively shown by the defendant that the
contrary is true. This view is the better, and is the one almost universally
followed by the courts.
H. R. H.

